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Double Down and Lose

Introduction

Tom Friedman's OP_ED piece in today's New York Times is worth reading for seemingly reasonable analysis but grossly wrong conclusions.

Friedman persists in advocating a "win" in Iraq - the Bandit's strategy - but acknowledges we are at a "tipping point." If things continue as they are, Iraq will probably fall into civil war. How does Friedman solve this problem? Double the number of boots on the ground.

Amazingly, Friedman says "liberals" are not talking about Iraq. I guess he doesn't read L&F.
 

 
Friedman's wrong conclusion is that Iraq is still "winnable," whatever that means. He comes to that conclusion after stating the commonly known facts: that the Iraqi "insurgency" is getting more powerful every day. His solution includes doubling the number of American troops in Iraq, a strategy commonly known among gamblers as "double down."

At the core of the gambling idea is the belief that, sooner or later, a streak of bad luck will reverse. That idea is probably true, as random sequences of coin tosses are not likely to tend one way or the other (head or tails) for prolonged periods. But in practice in Reno, Wall St or Iraq, double-down has some potentially fatal flaws. First, it assumes the player can continue doubling-down indefinitely until his "luck" changes; i.e., the theoretical double-down player never runs out of chips. Second, random sequences have no assured end, so there is always the probability "the House" will survive longer than the player; i.e., there is always a random sequence of "bad luck" that can outrun any finite pool of capital. Third, each step of double-down increases the total amounts at stake, so the players' investment is exponentially greater. The human psyche reacts wrongly to this situation, wanting ever more desperately to win as the losses mount; i.e. emotional players are ever more committed to the game. For the human reason, double-downers are mostly losers.

One of the hardest lessons to learn about investing, whether on Wall St or anywhere else, is when to call it quits. Double-down may be justified, but it does require detailed justification. One cannot assume that losses are just "bad luck." There might be good reasons why a player loses big bets: maybe the House cheats, maybe the player's judgement is wrong, maybe there are hidden or unconsidered factors. Most novice, get-rich-quick and emotional investors simply cannot stand the idea of losing, so they never make a dispassionate judgement. They almost always invest too much, too fast, and only to win. They are the classic long shot players at the racetrack who exuberantly proclaim, "On the Nose, to Win!" They are almost always unwilling to accept any loss, despite hearing repeated advice to call it quits. So, eventually, they lose it all.

How do I know all that? Because I've personally made all the mistakes and lost fortunes on Wall St. I've "been there, done that." Nevertheless, I didn't lose it all and still invest, but far more carefully. I have learned to stick to a rational investment plan so far as possible and not get overly excited about this or that deviation from the plan. I've learned to accept my losses and setbacks. I've learned the hard way about limits, and not investing more than I can really afford. Players who cannot cover their bets lose everything, including their freedom and lives. Far better to moan about losing something, but at least be there with something left. It is the same lesson I learned in business: I had to make (or recover) enough to be there tomorrow. (Did you forget Gone with the Wind?)

With respect to Iraq, I think Tom Friedman is an emotional player. I think he has a deep commitment to Israel, so hopes the Middle Eastern problems will be solved. He's different from the Bandit and the White House gang who are cool and calculating (a "Dr Death" Cheney trait). But both of them are the same in this respect: they are willing to play with our capital, not theirs. Thus, when Friedman suggests doubling the American military presence in Iraq, We the People are going to pick up the tab. It's our young people who will be drafted to go there (because they aren't volunteering), where some will die. Neither the Bandit nor Friedman are willing to put all theirs and their own on the line in Iraq.

Where have we heard all of this before? Those of us old enough know. It shifted into high gear in the Gulf of Tonkin (which turned out to be a lie). Then we had to "support the troops" (who didn't want to go). LBJ, we recently found out, knew the war in Vietnam was unwinnable, but he hoped for an "honorable peace." That was Nixon's goal, too (but it was never achieved). Around 55,000 dead Americans and no-one-knows how many million Vietnamese later, it was over in 1975. The United States lost in Vietnam. After World War I, Nazi propaganda told the German people Versailles was a "stab in the back." Germany hadn't really been beaten; it had been betrayed. Now the Fascists in charge of America are selling the same line about Vietnam. The "stab in the back" propaganda justifies the belief that we can win in Iraq, if only we push hard enough and we are not betrayed. Iraq is a test of our will, which will also reveal the truth about Vietnam. According to neo-cons, cold-war liberals and other jingoist war hawks, America was never beaten and cannot be beaten.

An interesting sidelight in Friedman's article is the theory that it is all a matter of will. His is the same theory the South held and still holds in fighting the American Civil War. The North did not win the Civil War because of a superior economy and better organization; rather, it was ultimately a failure of nerve that led Gen Lee to surrender at Appomattox. At the time of the surrender, there was a strong Confederate belief that the Southern forces should regroup in the mountains and become guerillas. Eventually, they believed, The Cause would be won; in fact, a belief still popular among Southerners 140 years later. But, Lee wasn't willing to become a subversive or destroy the lives of so many more men, so he surrendered. He is not a hero in the South, especially since Grant treated him with respect. If only he had had "true grit" ...

Friedman curiously combines that old Southern "fighting spirit" theory with the Northern muscle approach. Surely that will win the war when our luck changes. Then there will be peace and freedom and democracy in Iraq - an example to all Arabs. Then, once they understand the delights of Western (Euro-American) culture, they will appreciate Israel as well. Then, they and we will live happily ever after.

What a dream! If only it were true!

 
Let's Talk About Iraq

by Thomas L. Friedman
Published: June 15, 2005
 
Ever since Iraq's remarkable election, the country has been descending deeper and deeper into violence. But no one in Washington wants to talk about it. Conservatives don't want to talk about it because, with a few exceptions, they think their job is just to applaud whatever the Bush team does. Liberals don't want to talk about Iraq because, with a few exceptions, they thought the war was wrong and deep down don't want the Bush team to succeed. As a result, Iraq is drifting sideways and the whole burden is being carried by our military. The rest of the country has gone shopping, which seems to suit Karl Rove just fine.

Well, we need to talk about Iraq. This is no time to give up - this is still winnable - but it is time to ask: What is our strategy? This question is urgent because Iraq is inching toward a dangerous tipping point - the point where the key communities begin to invest more energy in preparing their own militias for a scramble for power - when everything falls apart, rather than investing their energies in making the hard compromises within and between their communities to build a unified, democratizing Iraq.

Our core problem in Iraq remains Donald Rumsfeld's disastrous decision - endorsed by President Bush - to invade Iraq on the cheap. From the day the looting started, it has been obvious that we did not have enough troops there. We have never fully controlled the terrain. Almost every problem we face in Iraq today - the rise of ethnic militias, the weakness of the economy, the shortages of gas and electricity, the kidnappings, the flight of middle-class professionals - flows from not having gone into Iraq with the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force.

Yes, yes, I know we are training Iraqi soldiers by the battalions, but I don't think this is the key. Who is training the insurgent-fascists? Nobody. And yet they are doing daily damage to U.S. and Iraqi forces. Training is overrated, in my book. Where you have motivated officers and soldiers, you have an army punching above its weight. Where you don't have motivated officers and soldiers, you have an army punching a clock.

Where do you get motivated officers and soldiers? That can come only from an Iraqi leader and government that are seen as representing all the country's main factions. So far the Iraqi political class has been a disappointment. The Kurds have been great. But the Sunni leaders have been shortsighted at best and malicious at worst, fantasizing that they are going to make a comeback to power through terror. As for the Shiites, their spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has been a positive force on the religious side, but he has no political analog. No Sh́'ite Hamid Karzai has emerged.

"We have no galvanizing figure right now," observed Kanan Makiya, the Iraqi historian who heads the Iraq Memory Foundation. "Sistani's counterpart on the democratic front has not emerged. Certainly, the Americans made many mistakes, but at this stage less and less can be blamed on them. The burden is on Iraqis. And we still have not risen to the magnitude of the opportunity before us."

I still don't know if a self-sustaining, united and democratizing Iraq is possible. I still believe it is a vital U.S. interest to find out. But the only way to find out is to create a secure environment. It is very hard for moderate, unifying, national leaders to emerge in a cauldron of violence.

Maybe it is too late, but before we give up on Iraq, why not actually try to do it right? Double the American boots on the ground and redouble the diplomatic effort to bring in those Sunnis who want to be part of the process and fight to the death those who don't. As Stanford's Larry Diamond, author of an important new book on the Iraq war, "Squandered Victory," puts it, we need "a bold mobilizing strategy" right now. That means the new Iraqi government, the U.S. and the U.N. teaming up to widen the political arena in Iraq, energizing the constitution-writing process and developing a communications-diplomatic strategy that puts our bloodthirsty enemies on the defensive rather than us. The Bush team has been weak in all these areas. For weeks now, we haven't even had ambassadors in Iraq, Afghanistan or Jordan.

We've already paid a huge price for the Rumsfeld Doctrine - "Just enough troops to lose." Calling for more troops now, I know, is the last thing anyone wants to hear. But we are fooling ourselves to think that a decent, normal, forward-looking Iraqi politics or army is going to emerge from a totally insecure environment, where you can feel safe only with your own tribe.
 

 

WalterB - clock 15:23:21 - Wednesday, 06/15/2005

 

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