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Introduction
A Our Inner Ape A Leading Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are Frans de Waal New York: Riverhead Books, 2005, 2006 (pbk.)

In this fascinating volume, Dr. Frans de Waal tells us the story of sex, power and violence among chimpanzees and bonobos. He also shows us that primates are kind. All of these traits are related to human behavior according to Dr. de Waal; they explain "why we are who we are."

As the book develops, it becomes obvious that Dr. de Waal is not only explaining primate ethology, but also making philosophical claims about the origin and nature of morality. In this review, I will focus on those claims, as Dr. de Waal is one center of arguments about evolution and naturalistic ethics. "Naturalistic ethics," in its current use, is not what Aristotle originally intended by the term, and is not within the traditional classification of Naturalism which took Aristotle as its exemplar. Rather, "naturalistic" in its present use is the claim that Homo sapiens evolved more or less as proposed by Darwin, and behaves in ways reflecting the species' evolution. Consequently, human behavior can be explained by reference to primate origins and development, and the peculiar adaptations of Homo sapiens. Further, "naturalistic" has scientific - not scientistic - connotations, which removes superstition and religion from consideration in the discussion.

At the outset, De Waal introduces us to the extant players of the primate game: chimpanzees, bonobos and humans. He expends more words on bonobos than the others, since most readers are probably unfamiliar with bonobos. They were only discovered as a separate species in the 1920s, whereas chimpanzees have been known to us for a few centuries. Since the existence of these near relatives was unsuspected until modern times, they are much less understood than, say, cats and dogs despite their similarities to ourselves. On account of human depredations, all non-human primates are endangered species.

de Waal gives a reprise under the chapter heading "Power" of work discussed in greater detail in Chimpanzee Politics. Chimpanzee society is structured in many ways the same as traditional, paternalistic human societies. Males fight endlessly for dominance, make alliances and copulate with as many females as they can. Males do the hunting and control the allocation of food, especially meat. When an alpha male is overthrown, the victors treat losers viciously. Luit's story reminded me of Italians hanging Mussolini and his mistress, Clara Pataki, by their feet on a rack on Milan. It is said the bodies were abused and mutilated.

The most salacious part of this book is the chapter on Sex, which will certainly appeal to most non-Americans but probably sends Puritanical Americans into hiding. It turns out that bonobos use sex on every possible occasion to smooth out things, and they do not suffer for it. Lesbian acts (GG rubbing) are especially common among females in matriarchal bonobo society. Bonobo males succeed by being protected and promoted by their mothers, not by infighting. While young chimpanzee males leave their troop to seek their fortunes in the world, bonobo males stay home and stick close to Mom. It is young bonobo females who go forth and conquer, presumably by their greater attractiveness. This proves human females who have enslaved a male are right to worry about bimbos. Those of us who lived in the Haight-Ashbury and participated in the counter-culture will be reassured that, after all, "Make Love, Not War," works. For this reason alone, this book should be mandatory reading for everyone who supported the last several Imperial wars.

In this book, Prof. de Waal is trying very hard to convince us that we are very much like our nearest primate relatives. Sometimes, particularly in our political lives, we are like chimpanzees. On the other hand, in more peaceful times, we are often more like bonobos. de Waals' point is not our differences, but our similarities, which could only come about if we have a shared "nature" with our close relatives. This nature cannot be purely genetic and pre-programmed, as all primates obviously learn things. More importantly, primate teach others what they learn, which leads to distinct cultures within the species. For example, de Waal conducted an experiment in which rhesus monkeys were taught peacemaking skills, showing "... that peacemaking is an acquired social skill rather than an instinct. It's part of social culture." (p. 155) This is a lesson which should be taught every schoolchild, especially in those warlike States of the Middle East and the Americas.

The book reaches its peak in the chapter on Kindness. There are all sorts of statements in this chapter which merit serious philosophical consideration, either in support or rebuttal. Prof. de Waal goes beyond his profession as primatologist here, applying his findings to the treacherous subject of ethics and morals. de Waal's use of common primate behavior to underpin his notions of morality, or at least its origins, also raises serious biological issues: is he observing analogous or homologous adaptations? ("Analogous" means arriving coincidentally at the same place. "Homologous" entails a cause or succession which takes things from state A to B.) Along the way, it seems to me de Waal is confused about defining or delimiting morality. While I still haven't unraveled all of it, and neither has anyone else, not even de Waals himself, following is my stab at what de Waals is explaining/proposing conjecturing.

A very central de Waals claim is "... it was assumed that empathy requires language. ... a host of scientists see language as the source of human intelligence rather than its product. Since a [human -ed] one year-old's behavior surely outstrips its verbal abilities, Carolyn's [Carolyn Zahn-Waxler - ed] research showed that empathy develops well before language." There are several claims in those sentences. The first claim is that empathy is at the root of morality in humans. Another claim is that such emotions precede language. Moreover, primates are intelligent in their use of emotions in social settings, so intelligence precedes language. On de Waals accounting, language is a secondary artifact of the evolution of intelligence in humans, which turns upside down major trends of Twentieth Century philosophy, Cognitive Science, Linguistics, etc. Most injured in this head-on collision are English-speaking philosophers, such as Wittgenstein's followers sitting in front seats.

Before attending to the multiple philosophical issues he raises, I must bring up this matter of intelligence. This is the same subject which philosophers and computer scientists rip apart and turn inside-out in pursuing the "thinking machine" challenge issued by A.M. Turing. Turing's Imitation Test ("The Turing Test") is entirely verbal. It presupposes that anything able to type meaningful sentences is intelligent. Turing did not consider the possibility that intelligence is other than verbal. Of course, we might expect that of mathematicians and most academics: they deal with words every hour of every day. The exceptions are in those Arts where people do painting, sculpture, music and theatre. In theatrical performances, words are usually intended to evoke emotional responses, and only secondarily to ignite "intellectual" chains of reasoning. The best artists do invite analytical thought as well as feelings; e.g., Mozart's Marriage of Figaro has several levels of meaning imbedded in its complex plot as well as its farce. Plays such as Othello and Macbeth certainly raise metaphysical questions arising out of our awe of the consequences of their tragic flaws. Hamlet and Oedipus Rex almost force us to think rather than merely emote. Yet, before all the pondering are the basic emotions those works arouse: delight, fear, sympathy, horror.

My inclination is to agree with de Waal on this point, narrowly construed: verbal language is secondary to intelligence. I believe, as does de Waal, there are more languages than just the verbal, and that many creatures communicate very effectively in those languages. I think anyone in the First and Second Worlds inclined to demonstrate this point to oneself may do so by sitting in front of a TV for a while with the sound turned down. McLuhan's The Medium is the Message will take over. Just in time for this review is this further evidence provided by the 2006 California elections: support for Prop 87 (Oil depletion tax) declined from over 80% to about 50% once people saw the ads. This use of Prof. Lakoff's framing happens over and over again: clever people supplied with lots of money will find a way to make your emotions override your intelligence. The Tobacco interests have done it over and over again, and may defeat yet another anti-smoking initiative (Prop. 86) this year. The key ingredients in the success of the propagandists are (1) non-verbal communication, (2) words which confuse verbal intelligence (so-called "logical thinking"), and (3) undefended emotions. The second item is necessary to disable any regulation of the emotions which might occur as a result of rational self-interest or training. Once verbal intelligence is out of the way, communication is directly emotional and totally effective. People cannot help themselves; they do just as they are told. As the common expression has it, the advertising people know how to "push your buttons." ("Issues" candidates and campaigns almost always fail these days because election propaganda disables verbal or "rational" processing, and emotions are more primitive.)

It should not be surprising to find emotions "prior" to intelligence in the evolutionary order. Looking at the various mammalian species, what we call intelligence is not widely distributed. The primates grabbed most of what there is of it. Why us, and not, say, camels or mice? I cannot answer that question, but it does not matter except in one sense: we are the ones doing the classifying, based on an intelligence with which we are familiar, our own. de Waal exposes this last consideration indirectly, but it is an important one. Those arguing about the Turing Test rapidly narrowed down its terms to things that interest computer people and some philosophers. The notion that the test might involve computers and people that make films or pottery isn't discussed. De Waal does us a service by opening up the territory to a more lively, less cerebral bunch.

There is always "on the other hand:" if pre-verbal intelligence of some sort was required to construct language, how does this relate to the evolutionary break-out of our species some 250,000 years ago? The larynx is required to speak as we do, and that, in turn, requires appropriate nervous system wiring. How did that come about? Surely it wasn't the result of a one night stand. There had to be more to it, such as lengthy residence in a tribe and village while grunts, trills and whistles were improved into commonly understood speeches and songs. Thus, it seems likely all these things co-evolved. The recent evolution of computers illustrates that sort of process. One invention begets another, when the second is a mere improvement on the original design. Unrelated things influence each other, just as TV inspired the development of Graphical User Interfaces (GUI or windows) for computers. The common element in those cases was cathode ray tubes put to different uses which made transitions easier than inventing the whole thing from scratch.

Until the late 1960s, simple alphanumeric terminals were made by inserting a mask between the electron beam and the screen. Displaying a letter or number on the screen was a matter of directing the electron beam through the appropriate slot in the mask. As transistors became smaller, it was far more practical to "print" the mask on memory chips as dots (a bit mask), and add circuits to read the dots into an electron beam controller. Once this step was taken, the patterns could be any combination of dots in the frame size. By the mid-1970s, this led to the dot matrix printer and the invention of a standard numbering systems for written symbols (ASCII, EBCDIC). Since standard TVs used a similar scanning system to that employed in computer monitors, TVs became computer monitors in the late 1970s. The reverse idea, that computer monitors are TVs, struck the computer industry in the early 1980s, resulting in the LISA, the MAC and WINDOWS. More recently, the digital TV is fast becoming the standard because it makes possible HDTV. During the last 30 years, there has been a high speed push-pull which improved all the players.

In the same way, I think language and physical features, such as a larynx, must have been involved in rapid development. While thoughts cannot determine or change genetic codes, the genetic changes which make language possible have such a high payoff that they must have been quickly adopted. In this case, social evolution including selection for the appropriate "language genes" might have been fairly rapid once it started. Prior to the development of speech, facial expressions, signs, directions and other acts may have been the outlet of intelligence. As the physical attributes of speech were acquired, they were probably put to work by that intelligence. The proto-speakers must have had an advantage, so their kind would have propagated quickly. While all of the foregoing is my speculation, I think it is a reasonable speculation.

Dr. de Waal seems to me correct in laying out primate predispositions to morality. He emphasizes empathy because he believes it is involved in reciprocity. Reciprocity requires memory and identification, together with some sort of valuation. To reciprocate, whether for good or evil, implies identification of oneself and the target. What is involved in empathy is identification of oneself with the target. To feel empathy is to identify another being as another with feelings, not just a rock or stick. It is very difficult to see how one creature could have empathy for another without also having identified itself as a similar being; i.e., empathy is at least a dyadic relationship. But, if creatures capable of empathy sense themselves as an individual like another (or vice versa), does that imply the ability to sense oneself and another as two separate individuals? Reciprocity based on empathy would seem to require the further step of identifying another and oneself, not merely as another like oneself. Does this mean those capable of reciprocity are conscious, self-aware, as we human think ourselves?

This last step is one Prof. de Waal seems to imply, soto voce, while never directly affirming that conclusion. He documents many acts of chimpanzees and bonobos which imply they are capable of kindness, and which suggest they have some knowledge of how others feel. That supports his declaration, "Moral decision-making is driven by emotions. It activates parts of the brain that go back to the transition from cold-blooded reptiles to the nursing, caring, loving mammals that we are. We are equipped with an internal compass that tells us how we ought to treat others." (p. 199) With that, and rejection of Kantian ethics in the next paragraph, de Waal commits himself to either emotivism or intuitionism (as in Hume). With the Enlightenment philosophes, he proposes a faculty of Practical Reason which (almost) infallibly guides our moral decision making. In this context, "almost" and "our" is sufficient, as de Waal only requires that people, on the average, make sufficiently "right" decisions to survive such evolutionary hurdles as are presented. That is, at the basic primate level of development, moral judgements need not be particularly and individually exact.

A few pages later, de Waal writes, "For me morality has to do with either Helping or (not) Hurting." This brings him to a discussion of reciprocity (pp. 202 ff.) By example, he shows that reciprocity has something to do with Helping or Hurting, It also leads to the Confucian principle of Balance, which is probably similar to Aristotle's Golden Mean. All of the tales told at this stage depend on the discussion of empathy, for it is assumed that the actors somehow know what the others are doing. In other words, de Waal imputes "intentionality" in his chimpanzee clients and that suggests a near-human awareness. In telling the story of Luit's rise and fall, it is clear de Waal believes Yeroen bided his time until an opportunity presented itself. Yeroen held a grudge for many moons, so he must have long term memory, the ability to identify others over time, and the further ability to make valuations about members of his society. If de Waal's description is true and accurate, that is impressive evidence for chimpanzee (and bonobo) sentience.

He wrote, "From humble beginnings noble principles arise." (p. 220) From this point through the end of the chapter on Kindness, things get murkier and murkier. What de Waal must do is account for "... how we moved from interpersonal relations to a system that focuses on the greater good." (p. 221) de Waal seems to believe, for unexplained reasons, that humans just became more and more socialized. It was the increasing socialization that moved a purely personal morality to a more general level. But, on the next page he retreats into another example of chimpanzee society which makes me wonder, what is the difference between chimpanzees and us? Where are the increased social abilities? On p. 223, he suggests human warfare was the socializing force; i.e., people were forced into closer association by wars. In this, he follows Hobbes in discovering 'the war of each against all' as the motivating force. But the same sort of thing happens in warring chimpanzee societies and doesn't result in generalized, community morality (so far as we know). So, we don't have a differential explanation.

He denies that culture or religion are the source of morality, but ambiguously asserts, "It's not that religion and culture don't have a role to play, but the building blocks of morality clearly predate humanity. ..." (p. 225) He concludes by pointing out empathy in bonobos and reciprocity in chimpanzees as moral building blocks. This fixes his position on the biology of morality: it develops by homology, not analogy.

Following that discussion, Prof. de Waal tries to apply what he knows about primate power, sex, violence and kindness to our presently conflicted human world. I believe his central notion is that human societies work better when there is a sense of community. I was most interested by his suggestion, "Our societies probably work best if they mimic as closely as possible the small-scale communities of our ancestors. We certainly did not evolve to live in cities with millions of people ..." (p. 245) In that sentiment (conclusion?) I heartily agree, and supported the idea in my GSQ.

This discussion will be continued, particularly with reference to de Waal's ethical theory in a forthcoming review of his new book, Primates and Philosophers (2006).

Our Inner Ape