One With Ninevah

 

Many of the topics in One with Ninevah are also treated in my book, The Graduate Student's Question (GSQ). While I understand and agree with most of the Erlichs' points, they come to the subject from a different place. This becomes obvious in the last chapter, when the Erlichs put forward their political recommendations. Most of this review will deal with that last chapter.

The Erlichs are famous for their latter day Malthusian views. That alignment is supposed to make them sourpusses. Given their wealth and status, they may be suspected of elitism; aristocrats whose intellectual claims are motivated by a dim view of the hoi polloi. But, on the whole, most of that is not true. The Erlichs' views are well founded science, based on facts. They do not seem to look down on the rest of humanity. However, their political solutions do smack of elitism or technocracy, which I attribute to lifetimes ensconced in academia, where they are regarded as benevolent Professors.

What is very clear in this book is the fact that Earth (I say Gaia) is overpopulated with Homo sapiens. The number of our species must be reduced to a sustainable level. The Erlichs make very clear that there are simply not enough resources to go around; certainly not at the First World standard of living. Surely the Erlichs' message must come through loud and clear to most Americans at this time, now that Hurricane Katrina has wrecked New Orleans and gas prices are over $3 per gallon. There is no room left to scoff these Professors.

Even so, I am impatient to get to the point of disagreement. The Erlichs conclude the book by proposing "... carefully delegated delegation could improve the functioning  of society ... Properly concentrated on key leverage issues, ... delegated delegation might reduce the negative effects of too much direct democracy, perhaps giving politicians some relief from the plethora of special-interest pressures." (p. 313) The hallmark institution of the Erlich "delegated delegation" regime is a proposed Federal Environment Authority. (p. 309)

The Erlich's proposal is essentially a Hobbesian choice: put Gort in place to oversee the irresolute childlike people. They hope the super-overseers will be Philosopher Kings. They admit that overseeing the overseers (which are powerful agencies) is necessary to avoid abuse of power. That would require an intelligent, informed and activist electorate as well as enlightened and dispassionate representation. In this last admission lies a contradiction and vicious circle. The practical reason for having a super agency is to make sure the foolish children are protected against themselves, that our Commonwealth does the right thing. The properly functioning super agency thereby discourages the children from growing up and taking adult responsibility; i.e., as conservatives charge, there is "moral hazard" in such an agency. If there are responsible adults, why do they need an all powerful executor?

The Erlichs write that direct democracy is impractical when there are large populations, so the solution of representation is required. They seem to believe that the American system is somehow the natural, correct result of requiring representation. This is revealed in their faulty analysis, "... a republic is a representative form of government." (p. 302) Wrong: the res publica is any governmental structure in which legitimate authority ultimately lies with the constituents. How the constituents exercise that authority is another matter; i.e., the particular structures of government are the means through which constituents demonstrate their choices (will). Technically, almost anything short of dictatorship or anarchy is consistent with the notion of res publica; the Republic. Those broad limits are exemplified in the particulars of the American system, which have changed from time to time. There is nothing necessary about the American system of representation.

The Erlichs disdain the rule of the mob, which they obviously fear. This is a frequent motive for accepting rule by an overlord (the Hobbesian choice). They are also motivated by an imperative, the desire to do Good by doing The Right Thing. It is this last point on which I most strenuously disagree. I have experienced and struggled with that powerful compulsion to do The Right Thing. I eventually freed myself of it, when I realized that "NO" is an acceptable answer.

This is a very difficult point for most people. Some people believe my views are an acceptance of The Devil or Evil. But, they are not that. The essential step in freeing oneself of compulsion is to realize that there are alternatives. No matter what, one could do this or that. In dumping compulsion, it turns out most of the time that saying "NO!" does not have dire consequences. But, even if the results are lethal, the possibility of another decision must be imminent.

My essential, philosophical point is this: contrary to Immanuel Kant, imperatives (commands) are not the source of morality or guidelines of moral behavior. An ought need not be presented as an infallible truth which one must obey. The sociological explanation of the Kantian Categorical Imperative is Kant's all too Prussian circumstances; his having been born and bred into a society structured by hierarchy and command. Obedience to authority was deeply imbedded in Prussian culture. It was a habit that led to the disastrous wars fomented by Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolph Hitler. While historical and sociological circumstances do not disprove a philosophical claim, they are at least counter examples showing how the imperative principle can be wrongly (immorally) applied. What those examples show is that imperatives only work for someone trained in obedience; someone who makes a connection between asserting an ought and actual performance. These examples also show that the actor has to invoke some form of independent  evaluation to determine whether to follow orders. That is, imperatives can only work as moral guidelines for those disposed to follow orders, if the moral agent makes a prior determination of the ethical validity of the imperative. Ethical judgement must precede and validate the imperative, which is only a command to behave as specified.

Therefore, even the Kantian Categorical Imperative must be validated by the separate and superior ability to make ethical judgements. In judging the Categorical Imperative a righteous maxim, we must appeal to some other criterion. This contradicts Kant's claim that the Categorical Imperative is both ethical principle and maxim. Imperatives are a useful intermediary between ethical judgement (decisions made on ethical principles) and action, but not compelling of themselves (despite their class name).

In undermining Kant's imperative ethics, I  allow mistakes. That is, a moral agent could decide something, believing it is the right thing to do at that time, but later discover the decision was an error. (Those using the Categorical Imperative could come to different judgements at different times.) The behavior which followed the decision may be determined to be immoral, or even unethical. (Immorality is a specific infraction, unethical decisions or behavior involve a general lack of principle.) If we believe there is "voluntary choice," the essence of being a free agent, we must also allow mistakes. If there are no mistakes, there are no free agents because there is no choice.

This brings us to the nub of the problem: the feeling people have - the feeling I once had - that something is so necessary as to be compelling. I hope the following obnoxious examples will not be so odious as to undermine my point, but they are necessary as shock therapy.

Were the civil rights of minorities so necessary that we must act to obtain them? Is civil disobedience justified? How about justifying the murder of oppressors? World War II - a war I approve in principle, if not in every practice - was fought to eliminate the Nazis, Fascists and other dictatorial, Imperialist regimes. It is arguable the Nazis themselves made the war a fight to the bitter end, as nothing would deter them from their practices except death. Followers of Osama Bin Laden in Al Qaeda and similar Islamic Jihadist organizations have set a similar stage. When there is no compromise, then a response based on some ultimate Good or Right is necessary. In those cases, it comes down to the right of every creature to live, if it can; i.e., the law of the jungle.

But is social justice in the United States so important that we should kill for it? History shows that there have been very different concepts of social justice in force in North America since the first European colonial settlements. The White Man, from the beginning, has believed that his form of social justice was worth the killing. The English settlers began killing Indians shortly after their arrival, and nearly killed them all. The English settlers enslaved black people from the beginning, and felt free to kill blacks (whether slave or free) at will. Until the Civil War, and long after, the consciences of most White People were not afflicted with any guilt or remorse for any crimes committed against minorities. We still have millions of Nazis and Racists on the loose in the United States, even if the approved culture now holds those views are inherently criminal. Clearly, there are at least two very different concepts of social justice alive and well in the United States.

Now, I believe those who struggled for Civil Rights were justified. They might have been justified had they killed some of their oppressors (which they rarely did). In fact, the violence of our time has mostly been rendered against those seeking a higher standard and a better life. The violence of oppressors has often been based on ignorance, bigotry and hate. I believe those seeking "a more moral" world may be justified in guerilla war. For example, the people may be justified in removing the present Fascist Bandit government by force. But, although I think reflection on ethical principles may warrant violent action, if only as a "lesser evil," such action cannot be undertaken reflexively; by command, as it were. It must be undertaken with "malice and aforethought." (This is over and above the risk of life and limb revolutionaries and protesters take in opposing existing authority, which always characterizes itself in moral terms as "legitimate.")

There is a difference between an act committed on account of considerations, or one performed in response to an imperative. In the former case, the agent balances what is being done against alternatives, whereas the obedient just follow their orders. While at Nuremberg it was decided that following orders is an insufficient defense against charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, nevertheless we exempt true robots and zombies from prosecution. There is a strong presumption that robots have no independent will - they cannot make voluntary choices - so they truly just follow their orders. For that reason, in the case of robots responsibility must lie elsewhere, conventionally in the agents who program them. At Nuremberg, however, it was assumed those on trial were not so diminished in their capacity of judgement as to be zombies or robots, so they were in some degree responsible, and to that degree accountable, for what they did. They could have refused, even if it meant losing their lives. What the Nuremberg principle says is, even paying an ultimate price may not be a sufficient excuse from the moral behavior expected of moral agents. If it is possible to say "no," we are accountable for saying "yes."

Political campaigns, religious organizations and other Causes often assume the social context of a war. There is the absolute necessity of winning, or having it "our way." The goals of the organization become the goals of the individual. Individuals are imbued with a fervor that puts the good of the group over that of any individual. Zeal is often displayed, even to the point of self-sacrifice. As Islamic suicide bombers show, human beings are incredibly susceptible to beliefs, even beliefs that are obviously destructive of the self and society. (What if everyone committed suicide?)

Has this discussion drifted far away from the Erlichs' very worthy intentions and practical political proposals? No, I don't think so. The Erlichs obviously believe their Cause - roughly, living in harmony with Nature - is so important, so overwhelming, that we should subscribe to an Environmental Philosopher King. In stiff-arming direct democracy as "impractical," the Erlichs are motivated by their imperative, the higher Good. They are justified in their proposal because of the necessity of doing the Right Thing.

I am sorry if I have not explained this well. It is difficult to explain. Having been overwhelmed by the necessity of a Cause earlier in my life, I know what the feeling is. That feeling can waylay reason (whatever that is) and throw it overboard. When that happens, any atrocity is justifiable and possible. Therefore, action - especially extreme action - must always be undertaken with hesitation and doubt. A moral agent fears entering battle because it knows it can and may die, that the outcome is not certain, and even that the Cause is not sure. This argument is not to advocate the seeming  indecision and immobility of Hamlet, but to promote Hamlet's knowing action in slaying the King at great cost to himself and others. One has to make the firm determination that it is worth it, and do it despite all the nagging doubts.

I think one has to live with an eternal "NO". I call this "'No' is an acceptable answer." Do I really have to go to McDonalds for a burger? Must I have an SUV? Must I send a Birthday greeting, Christmas card, or other customary offerings, just because loved ones or society bid it? Must I bow my head when the rulers speak? Is there any difference between the occupant and the office which requires my respect? Am I required to oppose evil in every instance, or can I pick and choose my causes?

What happens if I just say "NO!" Would the world be any different? Is my action truly significant, or would the world go about its business ignorant of anything I did?

There is no doubt in mind that direct democracy does not work well in mass societies. The desirability of democracy is a major reason for reducing the population to manageable proportions. While I agree with the Erlichs in proposing a large, effective government, I also agree that solution depends on an informed and effective citizenry. Unlike the Erlichs, I think the only way we will arrive at a responsible electorate is through local control. That is, intelligent citizens will only arise  from a hard evolutionary struggle. By putting matters squarely before the citizens at the local level, and allowing them to make the mistakes that destroy their lives, eventually people will learn (or they won't). Mine is a very hard nosed, Darwinian approach to the eventual egalitarian democracy. In my old age, I have become convinced people only learn in the school of "hard knocks," but, also, in the long run they do learn. (Otherwise, wherefrom Faust or The Bomb?)

This is not to support the Libertarians, the Anarchists or Conservatives. I don't like the sort of societies they propose. I prefer the "communitarian" way of life. Many Universities already offer such a life within their precincts, which makes University towns a more pleasant place to live than most other places. It's easy to forget in academia the extreme dangers of authoritarian government, even if one is confronted by them everyday in the newspaper. But the suggestion of a headline is not at all the same thing as the impact of falling bombs.

So, unfortunately, I am for MORE direct democracy. The struggle must go on. If we ever get a Federal Environment Authority, it will be because the people and the politicians are enlightened enough to realize the necessity of it. I am a fervent supporter of space travel, but I also recognize it as something to be undertaken rationally, by consensus. None of these things can be mandated by some imperative. We have to accept the possibility that we will never get there from here.

Finally, the Erlichs must feel their cause is imperative because a possible alternative is the extinction of the human race. But, I ask, so what? Lots of other species have been exterminated in the long, torturous history of life on Gaia. Ours would surely not be the last to suffer that fate. If Homo sapiens is to survive, it will have to find an accommodation with the natural world in which our species exists. That accommodation would have to be generally accepted and lived by. The ever-present possibility of extinction should be sufficient enforcement of that accommodation for a rational species.

The Erlichs write that such an accommodation must be the result of conscious cultural choice (p. 270 ff). That is exactly correct and what GSQ is all about. The only way that choice will ever be made is by freeing people, not binding them.