1776

What David McCullough illustrates is how close the American War of Independence came to failure. The rebels took on their masters, the greatest Empire of its time, the British. They had little hope of winning their cause from the start, and didn't even have solid support of their fellow colonials. Despite the long odds, the United States freed itself from Great Britain.

McCullough demonstrates that George Washington was not the spectacular leader of our indoctrination. He was indecisive. He often delegated decisions that he should have made to his subordinates, because he could not decide what to do. He was not a military expert, but had the good luck to find a few recently self-educated military commanders. The timing of his decisions was not good. Despite all that, Washington had one quality that others did not have, and which was critical to the success of the rebellion: perserverance. George Washington refused to admit defeat. He was courageous. He frequently rode up to the front lines of battle, and was nearly killed several times. It was probably his indominitable character that enforced on others his command. Even the British, who started by despising Washington, eventually learned to respect him.

Washington was fortunate in his enemies, often a critical factor in wars. The British Gen Howe was methodical, but slow. On several occasions, the British forces could have captured or destroyed the entire American army, but did not. For example, Howe delayed in capturing Dorchester Heights, which allowed the American plan to fortify the Heights to succeed. Howe delayed the advance from Jamaica Pass in the Battle of Long Island, thus allowing the Americans to escape. Howe opposed and detested some of his inferiors, such as Gen. Clinton, even though they were superior military men. Thus, the war plans approved by the brothers, Gen and Lord Howe, were not always the best.

The Crown mistakenly offered settlement in terms demeaning to the colonials. George III's terms encouraged the rebels to fight on, for reasons of personal dignity as well as nascent patriotism. Gen. Howe compounded this error at times by the humiliating manner in which he approached Washington. British diplomacy reflected the British attitude toward colonials, that they were a filithy, ignorant and undiciplined mass. Benjamin Franklin had learned this lesson years earlier, when he pleaded his case at Court. That hearing turned Franklin from an English subject into an American. The British Army in America had the unfortunate habit of repeating that mistake, over and over, during the course of the Revolutionary war.

McCullough doesn't often mention British arrogance explicitly, but it is clear aristocratic attitudes had a lot to do with the war's progress. For example, at Boston, lower level British officers had a clearer and better understanding of the military situation, but were not promoted to top level command positions because they lacked political and social standing. Thus, those in charge were not in receipt of the best available assistance, which helped the rebels greatly. The same arrogance underestimated the American army at Long Island, which encouraged Gen Howe to delay hot pursuit. The British were subsequently astonished when Washington crossed the Delaware in the dead of winter and decimated the Trenton Hessians.